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REALLY BORING ART 
 




There is little question as to whether there is good boring art, though its existence raises a number of 
questions for both the philosophy of art and the philosophy of emotions. How can boredom ever be a 
desideratum of art? How can our standing commitments concerning the nature of aesthetic experience and 
artistic value accommodate the existence of boring art? How can being bored constitute an appropriate mode 
of engagement with a work of art as a work of art? More broadly, how can there be works of art whose very 
success requires the experience of boredom? Our goal in this paper is threefold. After offering a brief survey 
of kinds of boring art, we: i) derive a set of questions that we argue constitutes the philosophical problem of 
boring art; ii) elaborate an empirically informed theory of boredom that furnishes the philosophical problem 
with a deeper sense of the affect at the heart of the phenomenon; and iii) conclude by offering and defending 
a solution to the problem that explains why and how artworks might wish to make the experience of 





REALLY BORING ART 
 






    HAMM:  We’re not beginning to...to...mean something? 
    CLOV: Mean something! You and I mean something! [Brief  
    laugh.] Ah that’s a good one! 






On July 25, 1964, Andy Warhol entered the TimeLife Building at the corner of 50th Street and 
the Avenue of the Americas in New York City. He was accompanied by poet and photographer 
Gerard Malanga, filmmakers Jonas Mekas and John Palmer, and Marie Desert, a member of the 
camera crew. Together they ascended to the 41st floor, the headquarters of the Rockefeller Foun-
dation. There they met Henry Romney, the vice president of the Foundation, who escorted them 
into an office. While the sun was still visible, Mekas set the camera on a tripod and framed a shot. 
Warhol looked through the camera, said “Yes”, and turned it on. The camera was pointing at the 
Empire State Building and was left running for six and a half hours.  
This is how Andy Warhol’s Empire was shot. A silent black and white film with just one pro-
tagonist: the immovable Empire State Building. The movie was shot at twenty-four frames per 
second but was projected at sixteen. As a result, it runs for a total of eight hours and five minutes. 
“Nothing was to happen in the film,” Arthur Danto notes, “other than what happened to it” (Danto 
2009: 79). Once, a viewer asked when the film was going to start, even though, unbeknownst to 
him, the film had started several minutes earlier (reported in Danto 2009: 78). On a different oc-
casion, viewers found Empire so offensively empty of point and purpose that they threatened to 
destroy the theater (Mekas 1969: 12). Early critical discussions of Empire focused on its apparent 
concern with demonstrating that one can fill over eight hours of cinematic time with, if not quite 
nothing, then just one thing that does nothing at all. The film is about “a big nothing,” art critic 
Gregory Battcock wrote (Battcock 1966: 39).  




thing,” wrote John Bernard Myers (Myers 1967:138).1 But if Empire is boring, and if Warhol created 
a work of art when making it, a number of questions arise. The art-historical question of whether 
there can be boring art—more precisely, the question of whether there are objects that have been 
enfranchised in the artworld which are intentionally boring—has already been answered in the 
affirmative by the many critics who have studied the phenomenon. In short, there certainly is bor-
ing art, and its history is a widely acknowledged chapter in the story of artistic modernism. Yet 
crucial philosophical questions remain even after the art-historical one has been settled. How can 
boredom ever be a desideratum of art? How can our standing commitments concerning the nature 
of aesthetic experience and artistic value accommodate this phenomenon, since, as we will see, the 
boring work of art appears to run dramatically afoul of many of these commitments? How can 
being bored ever constitute an appropriate mode of engagement with a work of art as a work of art? 
How can there be works of art whose very success requires the experience of boredom? And finally, 
how can we render intelligible that improbable conjunction of claims “this is really boring” and “I 
really liked it,” uttered sincerely and in respect to the very same object of aesthetic experience?  
The lack of philosophical writings on boredom in art is surprising,2 given the rich history of 
this topic in art criticism and the great interest in aesthetics on various puzzles of negative emotions 
in art. But even when boredom is not ignored, either in philosophy or in art theory and criticism, 
discussions of the nature of boredom tend to be uninformed by important recent theories of emo-
tion and cutting-edge work in the relevant empirical sciences. Such neglect is unfortunate. Without 
a proper understanding of the character of the experience of boredom (i.e., its affective, cognitive, 
and volitional components; its antecedents, effects, and concomitants), we run the risk of misun-
derstanding it and of drawing the wrong conclusions regarding what its presence may signify. In-
deed, in light of a wave of recent empirical studies on the character and function of boredom, we 
are now in a position to appreciate not just the dynamic and complex nature of boredom but also 
its place and role in aesthetic experience.  
What we are undertaking in this essay is not an investigation into the very possibility of boring 
 
1  More recently, Warwick (2011) notes that the “simple reality” of films like Empire is that they are “boring.” And 
in his study of static cinema, Remes writes that “Warhol’s static films are interesting precisely because they are boring” 
(2015: 52).  
2  For example, there are no articles on the topic of boredom in art in any of the major generalist philosophy journals 
(The Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Philosophical Review, Noûs, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research), 
and of the two journals specializing in philosophy of art and aesthetics (The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism and The 
British Journal of Aesthetics), only in the former has the issue of boredom received any attention. Boredom is discussed in 
the following articles: Colpitt (1985), Lind (1986), Matravers (1995), and Moller (2014). We acknowledge our debt to 




art—it is no mystery that bad or failed art can be boring. Our concern is with the existence of good 
boring art, and especially with a subset of these works that appear to be successful as art precisely 
because of the manner in which they bore. Our goal in this paper is threefold. After offering a brief 
survey of kinds of boring art, we: i) derive a set of questions that we argue constitutes the philo-
sophical problem of boring art; ii) elaborate an empirically informed theory of boredom that fur-
nishes the philosophical problem with a deeper sense of the affect at the heart of the phenomenon; 
and iii) conclude by offering and defending a solution to the problem that explains why and how 




If one is skeptical of the existence of the phenomenon we are exploring here, there are clear exam-
ples of celebrated artworks that are, on the face of it, boring and widely recognized as such. There 
is L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poetry, which often intentionally and enthusiastically banishes mean-
ing from verse. There is John Ashbery’s acclaimed Flow Chart whose 4,794 lines are, from the 
standpoint of syntax and semantics, frequently unintelligible and which routinely refuse to culmi-
nate in a discernable point. There are novels, that modern invention so fantastically apt for chron-
icling the minutia of experience and the rhythms and ticks of the everyday, that bore and often 
intentionally so. Think of the cetology sections of Moby Dick, Samuel Beckett’s trilogy (Molloy, 
Malone Dies, The Unnamable), or David Foster Wallace’s The Pale King, a novel that informs the reader 
that, “if you are immune to boredom, there is literally nothing you cannot accomplish,” and that 
tests the hypothesis with extensive discussions of IRS tax law (Wallace 2012: §44). Even James 
Joyce’s Ulysses was found to be boring.3 There are also boring plays. The first New York Times’s 
review of Samuel Beckett’s masterpiece, Endgame, described it as “a portrait of desolation, loveless-
ness, boredom, ruthlessness, sorrow, nothingness” (cited in Ventzislavov 2018: 202). There are the 
theatrical creations of Robert Wilson in which single actions may last for hours and whose plays 
can take days to complete. There are the renowned works of slow cinema4 (e.g., Béla Taar’s 
 
3  In his erudite defense of the novel against charges of obscenity, Judge John M. Woolsey found the book to be 
“brilliant” but also “dull, unintelligible and obscure” (United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses”, 5 F. Supp. 182, 
S.D.N.Y. 1933). 
4  Not to mention those of static or avant-garde cinema. Works such as Larry Gottheim’s Fog Line, Michael Snow’s 
Wavelength, Ernie Gehr’s Serene Velocity, James Coleman’s La tache aveugle (The Blind Spot), and Chieko Shiomi’s Disappearing 




Sátántangó or Chantal Akerman’s Jeanne Dielman, 23 Commerce Quay, 1080 Brussels) which are charac-
terized by the employment of long shots, an emphasis on the everyday and mundane, and under-
stated, sometimes almost absent, storytelling. There is minimalist or conceptual music—creations 
that consist either of silence or of simple, monotonous sequences of sounds.5 And there are repeti-
tive, long, seemingly unending, musical compositions. Satie’s Vexations, if played in its entirety, that 
is, 840 times, is boring. Wagner’s Ring Cycle is very frequently boring, and so are many second 
movements of symphonies.6 Contemporary dance has blurred the distinction between dance and 
ordinary action (sometimes, even inaction) and in doing so often solicits, perhaps as a test or prov-
ocation, boredom. Steven Paxton's Satisfying Lover and Yvonne Rainer’s We Shall Run are just two 
examples. Even within traditional visual arts, e.g., painting or sculpture, there is plenty of boredom. 
Minimalist works are often taken to be the paradigms of boring visual art: inexpressive and lacking 
in interesting content, they have, according to some, “raised boredom to an aesthetic principle” 
(Mellow 1968: 21; quoted in Colpitt 1985).7 Think of the monochrome paintings of Ad Reinhardt, 
Ralph Humphrey, Aleksandr Rodchenko, Kazimir Malevich, Robert Rauschenberg, Yves Klein, 
Robert Ryman, and Brice Marden. The list goes on.   
The above examples suffice to demonstrate that boredom figures prominently in a variety of 
works of art. There is always the possibility of critical disagreement, and one may take issue with 
one or another of the works we put on this list. And some of the examples perhaps merely show 
that works of art at times have boring elements. We do need to understand why an artist would be 
inclined to enlist boredom to any degree in their aesthetic and artistic pursuits, and we will have 
much to say about this. But a proper puzzle arises when we note that a number of these examples 
give us reason to think there is a special class of boring works, namely, works of art that are not 
only intentionally boring, but thoroughly and essentially so. They are works that present themselves 
as, if you will, not good-though-boring but good-because-boring. It is by virtue of being boring that 
they stake part of their claim to artistic and aesthetic success. 8  
 
5  For instance, the score of La Monte Young's Compositions 1960 #7 involves only a sustained open fifth (a B3 and 
F#4) whereas that of Composition 1960 #9 consists simply of a horizontal line. 
6  Elpidorou (2020a); Moller (2014). 
7  Others criticized minimalist art for a kind of superficiality, not unconnected to the lack of content and novelty. 
See, e.g., Greenberg (1967), reprinted in Battcock (1995). 
8  The claim that these artworks are good because they are boring does not mean that they are good only because 
they are boring. As we will argue in the fifth section, an artistically successful use of boredom creates a distinctive 
affective mode of engagement between artwork and observer such that the experience of boredom elevates the various 
properties of an artwork to the status of proper aesthetic properties. In this way, even though boredom does not confer 
on its own aesthetic status on an object, it is both essential in rendering it a successful work of art and an ineliminable 




Call the artworks that populate this class resolutely boring, and think of them as works in which 
boredom, on the face of it, plays a general organizational role: it describes how the elements of a 
work are arranged, presented, and are expected to be experienced, even “appreciated,” assuming 
sense can be made of that term in this context. It is instructive to compare resolutely boring art-
works to resolutely boring experiences. In the case of the latter, there may be features of our environ-
ment that themselves are not inherently boring; but in these everyday cases our environment, re-
gardless of its composition and promise for use and engagement, is experienced, if you will, boringly. 
The idea we are after in respect to resolutely boring art is similar. The adverbial qualification is 
key. A resolutely boring work of art, as we are thinking of it, is one that, whatever its properties and 
point, opts to present them boringly, such that the informed critic will be justified in calling it a 
boring work. Surely in many cases this will come in degrees and the relationship between the aes-
thetic and artistic features of a work and their boring manner of presentation will be nuanced and 
complex, though Empire furnishes an example of a resolutely boring artwork that approximates the 
ideal of this class of works. It is the possibility of apparently resolutely boring works of art that will 
be our primary focus. These are not abortive or halfhearted attempts at art. The list of resolutely 
boring works includes some of the most celebrated artworks of recent history. In short, what our 
paper undertakes is a study not of forms of failure but of a deeply puzzling form of success.  
The existence of this class of resolutely boring works of art presents an obvious philosophical 
problem. On the one hand, many of our traditional theories of art and the aesthetic9 give us pow-
erful reasons for thinking that it is true, perhaps even trivially so, that works of art, insofar as they 
are works of art, are stimulating, arresting, interesting, immersive, or engaging. Derek Matravers 
puts the point concisely when he says that the very idea of boring art appears to “violate the deeply-
held intuition that there is a connection between experiencing a work of art and appreciating it” 
(Matravers 1995: 426). Stronger still, boredom is often associated with a form of frustration, as Susan 
Sontag has argued (Sontag 2001: 303); and to find a work boring would appear to place it in the 
extended family of things that are exasperating, annoying, irritating, vexing, and disappointing. It is hard to 
think of a family less hospitable to our understanding of art, except, perhaps, the family of things 
that are junk, clutter, and waste (though they too have a history). We tend to think that good art 
can be many things—terrifying, melancholic, sobering, surprising, offensive, even disgusting—but 
it just cannot be boring. This is what Donald Judd had in mind when, in defense of the new art of 
 
9  For discussion, see Lopes (2018), Bonzan (2009), Feagin (1996), Hanson (2018), McGonigal (2018), Moran (2012), 




the 1960s, he claimed, “I can’t see how any good work can be boring or monotonous in the usual 
sense of those words. And no one has developed an unusual sense of them” (Judd 1975 [1966]): 
190). Art critic Lucy R. Lippard repeats this sentiment in a well-known 1966 review of structural-
ist/minimalist sculptures. “As far as I am concerned,” she writes, “good art is never boring no 
matter how spare it is” (Lippard 1966: 50).    
It is important to note that the problem resolutely boring art raises goes beyond the standard 
“paradoxes” of negative emotions that contemporary philosophers of art have so thoroughly doc-
umented, though if our argument is sound, boring art constitutes a new and peculiar addition to 
the literature on this topic.10 For instance, the so-called paradoxes of tragedy and horror, which 
have received the lion’s share of attention, are animated by the attempt to understand how we can 
enjoy affective responses to art that are inherently unpleasant. How can we take pleasure in the 
experience of pity, fear, terror, disgust, and despair, given that the phenomenological profiles of 
these emotions are characterized by the presence of pain and absence of pleasure? We can add 
boredom to the list, but it is important to see a disanalogy. For one, given certain assumptions 
about human nature, there is nothing counterintuitive in the idea that we can find images of suf-
fering, catastrophe, and the horrid immersive, engrossing, and stimulating. As Aristotle (1995: 
1448b3-4) reminded us at outset of philosophical work on these issues, “we take delight in seeing 
[....] a pile of corpses” (translation ours). Thus Berys Gaut (1993) argues, in respect to the enjoy-
ment of horror, that in a certain atypical class of humans, fear can produce pleasure, even as it 
evaluates its object negatively.  
Or think of the many solutions to the puzzles of negative emotion in art that are variations 
on the following theme: while the negative emotions are inherently unpleasant, a successful work 
devises a manner of presenting the horrid, disgusting, tragic, or ugly, in a word, interestingly, not 
unlike the strategy we employ when we compensate for an undesirable gift by delivering it in an 
attractive box. That is, the artwork furnishes second-order rewards to intrinsically painful first-
order experiences: the unpleasant elements are made interesting, say by being presented as objects 
of curiosity, appealing to prurient and taboo desires, and the like. But boring art presents the pre-
cise problem that it does because we seem to have no recourse to the idea of interest at all. With 
boredom we lose access to the varieties of cognitive and affective concern that the standard puzzles 
of negative emotions in art can invoke. As one imagines is the case with the viewers of Aristotle’s 
pile of corpses, these negative emotions admit of the kind of immersion in evidence when we yell 
 




“Ew!” but somehow cannot divert our attention from the horror before us. Reflections of this sort 
show how much more vexing the notion of boring art is than that, say, of ugly or horrific art, since 
we evidently cannot lodge the intuitive claim that, despite our theories, we are such as to be tanta-
lized by the boring. It is gospel in work on art and negative emotions that a solution demands some 
access to positive forms of aesthetic immersion in an artwork, even if the form it takes is salacious, 
voyeuristic, or schadenfröhlich. The moves typified by Gaut and those who invoke notions of second-
order pleasure are thus not available in the case of resolutely boring art, since boredom character-
izes its object as unable to repay not this or that kind of interest (aesthetic, moral, etc.) but interest 
itself. It is for this reason that many scholars in the debate contrast the experience of negative 
emotions in art with boredom, since it is the ability to elicit some kind of affect (even a painful one) 
without compromising interest and immersion that typically provide the terms of artistic success in 
these debates. 
There is a further problem. Experiences of pity, fear, horror, and sadness are standardly 
highly episodic and element-specific emotional responses to artworks. We pity Desdemona as 
Othello smothers her; we are terrified that Medea will murder her children to spite Jason; we are 
horrified by the image of the maniac in a hockey mask disemboweling the teenage camper. In all 
these cases, there is the rest of the work that is there to offer compensatory pleasures. As such, it is 
always possible to claim, with Noël Carroll, that these negative emotions are simply “the price we 
pay” for the other gratifications the work affords (Carroll 1990: 186). To call a work tragic or 
terrifying merely indicates a prominent and intended affective response to this or that feature of its 
content. But as many of the above examples make clear, boredom is often a much more compre-
hensive affective response. In resolutely boring artworks, boredom is a response to the work taken 
whole, and Carroll-type arguments evidently cannot help us dissolve the mystery.  
Lastly, in many of the standard paradoxes it matters greatly that our emotions are directed 
toward representations, typically fictional, which itself creates a number of puzzles. In these cases, 
it is always an option to make two moves, neither of which is available in the case of resolutely 
boring art. One can argue that since the intentional object of my emotion concerns an acknowl-
edged fictional truth (Othello is smothering Desdemona), then it is arguably the case that it is 
merely fictionally true that I fear her imminent demise. This isn’t to say that the emotions the fictions 
prompt are “unreal,” but it is to claim, with Kendal Walton, that they are the kinds of emotion we 
have when assuming the role of a participant immersed in a game of make-believe.11 Add to this 
 
11  See Kendal Walton (1978) for the locus classicus of this argument. His position has been elaborated and refined 




that the acknowledgment of the fictionality of my emotion’s intentional object introduces a distanc-
ing effect such that I am aware that my object, precisely because fictional, implies nothing about the 
wellbeing of any real person. Here’s the rub. As Matthew Strohl notes in respect to another under-
researched affect in this context, agitation, “it doesn’t matter whether this nuisance is a fictional 
representation” (Strohl 2018: 2). It is likewise with boredom. In respect to the cases we have ex-
plored, we cannot say that the puzzle is merely apparent because we are in fact only fictionally bored 
by a work. Boredom takes as its object the perceived significance and meaning of the experience 
that an artwork affords and not the fictional truths that compose its content, though those too can 
be boring. In this sense, resolutely boring artworks are fiction-indifferent and the boredom they 
inspire appears to be straightforwardly continuous with the experience of boredom in everyday 
contexts. Since this is so, the phenomenon of resolutely art does not grant us access to the notion 
of distancing effects and the excuses they can provide when we try to make sense of how we can 
enjoy tragic, distressing, and immoral fictional content.  
If we put all of these worries together, the basic problem is this. A work that presents its 
content boringly in the resolute sense would seem bound to be experienced as having no aesthetic 
properties. Boredom doesn’t merely block us from experiencing a work’s potential aesthetic value; 
its presence implies that there is none to be experienced. The above arguments trouble not just the 
familiar matter of whether we can take aesthetic satisfaction in a painful or otherwise “negative” 
experience; they cast suspicion on the very idea that we can describe an experience as aesthetic 
when its object fails to elicit the basic forms of interest, appreciation, care, concern, curiosity, im-
mersion, investment—take your pick—that are the hallmark of aesthetic experience. Boredom 
characterizes its object as insignificant and meaningless, and, whatever one’s theory of the aesthetic, 
surely it commits one to thinking that it is the role of aesthetic properties12 to endow their bearer 
with some form of significance and meaning. Given this, resolutely boring art would appear des-
tined to suffer from a chronic failure of aesthetic enrichment.  
 So far we have made use of an intuitive and untheorized notion of boredom. What we 
explore next is what happens to the puzzle once a measure of sophistication is introduced. In the 
next section we offer a theory of boredom, and after that we shall return to the issue with a more 
nuanced account of the problems it raises for art and the nature of aesthetic experience. We will 
see that we can be literalists about the phenomenon: there are resolutely boring artworks that are 
 
12  Thus, this argument goes through regardless of whether we are speaking of “positive” or “negative” aesthetic 
properties. We do not have the space to introduce the notion of negative aesthetic properties here (though it is im-
plicit in the above discussion), but the line of argument here would appear to apply just as readily to them as it does 




good as art because of the manner in which they bore, and this is compatible with the claim that 
we enjoy them, indeed that they bring within our appreciative purview recognizable varieties of 
aesthetic value. Needless to say, earning the right to make these claims will require revising some 





In this section, we focus on empirical research on boredom and elaborate the character of state 
boredom. As a first approximation, state boredom is an aversive experience that signifies a failure to 
engage with one’s environment in a desired manner despite one’s wish to do so. State boredom is 
“simple” or “ordinary” boredom. It is the boredom that most of us feel—that which we experience, 
for instance, when we wait for a delayed bus, scroll down our social media feed in order to kill time, 
pretend to enjoy the company of those who we find tiresome, or engage in monotonous or repeti-
tive tasks.  
An empirical investigation of state boredom is appropriate in the present context. Boredom 
in the face of an artwork is different from many of the things that have been called “boredom,” 
e.g., existential dread, depression, ongoing melancholy, or metaphysical despair. It is instead state 
boredom: an experience that is elicited by our encounter with the work of art; that depends upon 
and is specific to a particular situation; and that lasts, typically, as long as we engage with the 
artwork in question.13 Investigations of other aesthetically relevant affective phenomena (e.g., dis-
gust, horror, fear, sadness) focus on the corresponding state of the phenomenon under question, 
and so shall we. 
State boredom (hereinafter, “boredom”) is a short-lived emotional experience 
characterized by feelings of dissatisfaction, a perception of meaninglessness, non-optimal (either 
low or high) arousal, attentional difficulties, and a desire to change one’s activities. In the literature, 
one finds different theoretical articulations of this emotional state. Often, such accounts single out 
 
13  The science of boredom distinguishes between state boredom and trait boredom. Trait boredom is conceptualized 
as the propensity to experience boredom often and in a wide range of situations and the most commonly used measure 
of it is the Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS) (Farmer and Sundberg 1986). We ignore trait boredom here. The theory 
of trait boredom is unclear and the validity of BPS is questionable (Elpidorou, 2020b; Gana et al., 2019; Struk et al., 
2017). Most importantly, a focus on trait boredom, which is understood to be a lasting personality trait (akin to 
depression or extroversion), is inappropriate in the present context. That is because any investigation of trait boredom 
would reveal more about individual differences—i.e., how boredom prone individuals react to art compared to those 




one particular aspect of the experience of state boredom and treat it as its essence. For instance, 
existential theories of boredom render one’s perception of meaninglessness as the core of boredom 
(Barbalet 1999; Maddi 1970); arousal theories take boredom to be a state of non-optimal arousal 
(Berlyne 1960); and attentional theories understand boredom to be the result of certain attentional 
or cognitive difficulties (Eastwood et al. 2012). We will not follow theoretical attempts to locate the 
essence of boredom in one of its cognitive, volitional, physiological, or experiential aspects. Instead, 
we adopt a functional perspective on boredom according to which boredom is the affective state 
that it is because of what it does. Such an account of boredom has been developed in various ways. 
A recent, detailed, and theoretically motived explication of the functional account treats boredom 
as a regulatory state that aims to promote the pursuit of meaningful, interesting, or engaging 
activities when our current activities cease to be so (Bench and Lench 2013; Danckert, Mugon, 
Struk, and Eastwood 2018; Elpidorou 2014, 2018a, 2018b). Boredom thus arises when we find 
ourselves in a state of dissatisfaction and acts as a “push” that can help us to move out of such a 
state and into one that is either in line with our interests and values or engaging. The functional 
account is well supported by extant empirical findings. Importantly, it also allows us to see how the 
various aspects of boredom come together in order to confer upon boredom its distinctive function. 
What is more, given its emphasis on what boredom does, the account is uniquely suited to articulate 
boredom’s effects on those who experience this affective state during their engagement with art.  
Why would one think that boredom is a functional state? The functional account of 
boredom is supported by what we know about boredom’s character, effects, and antecedents. 
Boredom is a multidimensional construct: it is a complex psychological state composed of 
experiential, cognitive, volitional, expressive, and physiological components. A characterization of 
each of its components would reveal, respectively, the felt quality of boredom, its effects on various 
cognitive and perceptual processes, the actions and desires prompted by its presence, its associated 
bodily, facial, and vocal expressions, and, finally, its neurological and physiological correlates. We 
do not need to articulate in full detail each of boredom’s components in order to make a case for 
its functional nature. Still, a brief discussion of (most of) its components would reveal enough about 
the nature of boredom and would allow us to discern both its functional nature and its importance 
in art.14 
 
14  We will not be discussing the expressive component of boredom. Although important for understanding its various 
manifestations and for distinguishing it from other related states, boredom’s bodily, facial, and vocal expressions have 
little bearing on boredom’s place in and relationship to art. See Wallbott (1998) and Elpidorou (2018a) for a review of 




Boredom’s most obvious characteristic is its felt quality. Phenomenologically speaking, bore-
dom is a negative state characterized by a felt dissatisfaction with one’s situation (Fahlman et al. 
2013; Harris 2000; Mikulas and Vodanovich 1993; Pekrun et al. 2010; Todman 2003; Vogel-
Walcutt et al. 2012). The subjective experience of boredom, however, is neither simple nor neces-
sarily uniform. Qualitative data on the character of the experience of boredom (Goetz and Frenzel 
2006; Harris 2000; Martin et al. 2006) reveal that even though individuals in a state of boredom 
often comment that they feel tired and lethargic, they also report feelings of restlessness, anxiety, 
irritability, and frustration (Harris 2000; Martin et al. 2006; Steinberger et al. 2016). Indeed, bore-
dom can be experienced as a state of uniform subjective arousal (it is either apathetic or energizing); 
as a state of mixed subjective arousal (while bored one is both mentally fatigued and eager or anx-
ious to do something else); or even as a temporally dynamic state that manifests itself as both apa-
thetic (low arousal) and energizing (high arousal), depending on endogenous and exogenous factors 
(Elpidorou 2020b; Mills and Christoff 2018).  
In terms of its cognitive nature, boredom is characterized, primarily, by attentional difficulties 
and the perception that one’s situation is meaningless. Although both attentional difficulties and 
perceived meaninglessness can be, either individually or jointly, the antecedents of boredom (West-
gate and Wilson 2018), they also constitute proper parts of the experience of boredom. Thus, while 
bored, one experiences difficulty sustaining one’s attention (Eastwood et al. 2012) and one becomes 
aware of fact that one’s situation is lacking in meaning (Van Tilburg and Igou 2012). In addition, 
the experience of boredom is often accompanied by mind-wandering (Harris 2000; Martin et al. 
2006). Such a feature of boredom is important. Mind-wandering mentally decouples one from the 
boring situation and allows one to bring to mind alternative and more preferable situations. Finally, 
it has been noted that bored individuals experience a slower passage of time (Gabriel 1988; Harto-
collis 1972; Martin et al. 2006; Tze et al. 2013; Wangh 1975; Watt 1991), something that could 
potentially contribute to the aversive character of the state of boredom. 
Whereas the cognitive elements of boredom disengage one from their situation and make 
salient alternative and more attractive possibilities, the volitional component of boredom acts as a 
catalyst for action. Boredom is characterized by a strong desire to escape one’s current (unsatisfac-
tory) situation (Berlyne 1960; Fahlman et al. 2013; Fiske and Maddi 1961; Mikulas and Vo-
danovich 1993; Pekrun et al. 2010; Todman 2003; Van Tilburg and Igou 2012). During boredom, 
one wishes to be doing something other than what one is currently doing (Fahlman et al. 2013). As 
such, boredom is not simply an unpleasant experience but, crucially, one that contains a strong 




ways, all of which share a common aim: to escape boredom’s unpleasantness. Boredom can foster 
creativity (Mann and Cadman 2014). It can trigger prosocial behavior (Van Tilburg and Igou 
2016) and lead to more extreme political orientations (Van Tilburg and Igou 2017). It can push us 
to shock ourselves when we are left alone with nothing to do (Nederkoorn et al. 2016; Wilson et al. 
2014). It may force nurses to kill and arsonists to start fires (Elpidorou 2020a), individuals to eat 
more (Havermans et al. 2015), and participants in a psychology study to enter rabbit holes (van 
Aart et al. 2010). In a series of publications, psychologists Wijnand Van Tilburg and Eric Igou 
have argued that what underlies one’s attempt to escape a boring situation is a desire to re-establish 
a sense of meaningfulness (Van Tilburg and Igou 2011, 2012, 2016, 2017; Van Tilburg et al. 2013). 
Boredom, according to their account, is both a crisis of meaning and an attempt to recover this 
lost meaning. What this body of work highlights is that boredom motivates one to find an activity 
that is more meaningful than the current one. Because meaning comes in various shapes and forms, 
our reactions to boredom are many and varied.  
It is important to note that it is not always possible for us to alleviate the experience of bore-
dom by escaping our situation. If behavioral escape is not possible and we lack a sufficient reason 
to engage with the boring situation, we may adopt a cognitive-avoidance strategy by engaging in 
mind-wandering (Fisher 1993; Harris 2000). However, if we are strongly motivated to engage with 
the boring situation, we may choose to alter the manner in which we engage with it. Often such a 
decision involves the cognitive reappraisal of the situation. For example, we could try to find mean-
ing or value in a boring activity by seeing it under a new light (Nett et al. 2010; Tze et al. 2013). 
This will become crucial when we return to art.  
Lastly, boredom is also characterized by its physiological and neurological correlates. For our 
purposes, it is not necessary to review these findings in any detail here. Suffice it to say that extant 
physiological studies of the experience of boredom do not agree as to whether boredom is, physi-
ologically speaking, a state of low, high, or mixed arousal. Fortunately, we do not need to settle the 
character of boredom’s physiological arousal (Elpidorou 2020b). All that it matters for our discus-
sion is that the physiological concomitants of the experience of boredom contribute to the exercise 
of its function. They can facilitate the pursuit of alternative situations, either by deactivating us 
(low arousal) and thus disengaging us from our current situation or by activating us (high arousal) 
and thus preparing us for action and change.15 
 
15  The neurological correlates of boredom are relatively unexplored and only in recent years have researchers began 
to investigate them. For reviews, see Danckert, Mugon, Struk, and Eastwood (2018), Elpidorou (2018a), Mills and 
Christoff (2018), and Raffaelli, Mills, and Christoff (2018). Still, it is worth noting the following: alpha waves have been 




In sum, boredom is an unpleasant state during which one experiences not only weariness and 
fatigue but also frustration and irritability. While bored, one is both disengaged from and dissatis-
fied with one’s situation. The situation lacks in meaning; it neither captures one’s attention nor 
interests one. At the same time, one is strongly motivated to pursue an alternative situation and 
will, in fact, go to great lengths to alleviate the experience of boredom. Our analysis of boredom 
strongly suggests that boredom is a functional state: boredom signals the need to change something 
about ourselves or our environment and it motivates us to do so. Boredom thus promotes the pur-
suit of alternative situations (physical or mental) when our current situation ceases to be interesting, 
engaging, or meaningful.  
The adoption of a functional approach contributes to our understanding of boredom by un-
derscoring its function in our mental and behavioral economy and by highlighting how the differ-
ent components of boredom work together in order to promote the exercise of its regulatory func-
tion. In addition to being informative about the state of boredom, a functional model of boredom 
is theoretically advantageous in the following two ways. First, a functional perspective on boredom 
synthesizes what appears to be a diverse and unruly field of research (Elpidorou 2018a). It can 
explain why boredom arises in the first place; why boredom’s presence is related to various mean-
ing re-establishing strategies; and why boredom might lead to a variety of behaviors, some harmful 
and some beneficial to the agent. Second, a functional characterization of boredom illustrates how 
boredom is distinct from both apathy and frustration. Boredom is not apathy because it is not a 
state of resignation or motivational loss: when bored we have not given up; rather, we are strongly 
motivated to escape our situation (Goldberg et al. 2011; Nisbet 1982). And boredom is not frustra-
tion because the aims of the two states are markedly different: frustration is often a call to persist 
in what we are doing and to overcome obstacles blocking our goals (Amsel 1992; Elpidorou 2020a), 
whereas boredom is a call to switch our activity when our activity ceases to be engaging or in line 
with our interests and values.  
The benefits of the functional view do not, however, end here. And the aim of the following 
two sections is to demonstrate how we can apply the functional view to art. We will argue that it is 
through a consideration of the functional nature of boredom that we can begin to understand the 
possibility of boring art. In other words, it is only when boredom is seen through a functional lens 
that boring art makes sense. 
 
 
the left DLPFC; and parts of the default mode network are activated during boredom. These findings suggest, 






Our discussion has shown that boredom is, fundamentally and despite appearances, a value-seek-
ing emotion. The crisis of meaning, interest, agency, and engagement at the heart of boredom 
activates a mode of reflection on, and confrontation with, its object, with either the goal of avoid-
ance or the aim of affective and cognitive reorientation towards it. As we highlighted in the previous 
section, such a type of reaction is often triggered by the realization that our situation lacks meaning 
(Chan et al. 2018; Fahlman et al. 2009; Van Tilburg & Igou 2011, 2017). Perceived meaningless-
ness need not be, however, the only negative appraisal that prompts us to alleviate boredom and 
to undo its causes. In the literature, it has been suggested that boredom is also related to appraisals 
of one’s situations as lacking in relevance (Fahlman et al. 2013), as being low in perceived autonomy 
(Caldwell et al. 1999; Martin et al. 2006; Steinberger et al. 2016; van Hooft & van Hooff 2018), 
and as offering non-optimal stimulation or challenge (Csikszentmihalyi 1975; Daschmann et al. 
2011). Whatever the underlying trigger might be, boredom is an unstable emotion that seeks its 
own undoing, with the tension characteristic of it functioning as motivation to re-establish one’s 
sense of connection to, broadly put, the meaningful and valuable. It is exactly this feature of bore-
dom that we take to be essential to understanding its role in the experience and appreciation of 
resolutely boring art.  
 Boring art is risky—more so than ugly, disgusting, or offensive art. If we were to attempt to 
mitigate the experience of boredom by leaving behind the situation that gave rise to it, as we do in 
many everyday cases, we would be effectively ending our engagement with the artwork. Such a 
reaction would render the boring artwork not a site of aesthetic engagement but an object that 
would simply redirect our attention elsewhere. Boring artworks would thus be reduced to mere 
“traffic” signs: objects that are of no aesthetic value but useful, perhaps, in helping us to move from 
one location to another. And so the most obvious way to answer boredom’s call for reestablishing 
meaning, interest, or engagement—viz. moving away from the situation or object that bores us—
appears to be one that is anathema to aesthetic appreciation. 
 Fortunately, within the context of art appreciation, such an evasive response to boredom, 
although possible, is often not our first reaction. After all, we put ourselves in the presence of an 
object (or event) that ought to be, we think, if not exciting or beautiful, at least interesting or en-
gaging. Because of that, we are motivated, certainly initially, to attempt to explore and make sense 




motivation will influence our experience of the artwork. In other words, it makes a world of differ-
ence whether we are weakly or strongly motivated to engage with the boring artwork. It is only in 
the latter case that an honest attempt to engage with the artwork is to be expected (Fisher 1993; 
Harris 2000; Nett, Goetz, and Hall 2011; Tze et al. 2013). The lesson here is that for its boredom 
to be aesthetically productive, a work of art must somehow instill in the audience the contention 
that it is worth engaging with. 
 It also matters how boredom is experienced. In fact, if low arousal boredom leads the sub-
ject to turn her attention elsewhere, we have a quick example of the fate of the unsuccessful work 
of boring art. But boredom in its highly aroused state hints at more desirable artistic outcomes, 
especially if this is coupled with a motivation to understand and engage with the artwork. In these 
cases, the perceived meaningless or felt blahness of an experience can propel the bored subject to 
reappraise the object, look for occluded dimensions of significance, and, generally put, righten 
one’s relationship to one’s situation (Elpidorou 2017). It is while bored that we are so propelled, and 
this gives the air of plausibility to the claim that an artist might wish to prolong this experience and 
explore the predicament of sense and significance it gives rise to, illuminating both the crisis itself 
as well the search for resolution. On the face of it, this would seem to be a deeply creative manner 
of pursuing the forms of philosophical, psychological, and moral insight that we expect from serious 
art.  
 Our concern is primarily with the hard case of resolutely boring works. Before we turn to 
the hard case, however, it is worth noting how much clarity our discussion brings to the weaker 
but still perplexing class of episodically boring works, which is, admittedly, by much the larger of 
the two classes. In episodically boring art, the work itself yields a type of affective and cognitive 
resolution, typically by furnishing appreciation with a positive meaning or experience that it has 
intentionally withheld, presumably before the curtain falls. The general dynamic of tension and 
release is certainly common in art, from the anticipatory function of diminished and altered dom-
inant chords that resolve to a happy major, to banal and desultory dialogue that culminates in an 
admission that changes the meaning of all past dramatic events. In this sense, the wandering mind 
characteristic of boredom is refocused, and the work of art repays our efforts by providing attention 
with an element of potential aesthetic immersion.  
 Our hypothesis is that there are two basic kinds of resolution boring artworks strive for, and 
the distinction will turn out to be key to our positive argument. Call one kind of resolution “en-
acted” and think of it as indicating the class of artworks that explicitly and intentionally relieve 




with properties that are intended to prompt positive aesthetic and affective appraisal. The sudden 
bursts of poetic diction and narrative development after Moby Dick’s cetology section provide an 
example of enacted resolution, as does the occasional appearance of a motif during the 40 minutes 
of free-form, atonal improvisation in John Coltrane’s Ascension. Prolonged episodes of boredom 
help prepare us to receive, often with greater intensity and reward, the aesthetic and artistic goods 
that a work wishes to deliver. This can be a powerful way of bringing to a reader’s, listener’s, or 
viewer’s reflective awareness features of the structure of aesthetic experience itself and the role it 
plays in the experience of art.   
 Matters become more philosophically and artistically interesting when we consider episod-
ically boring works that do not enact this resolution, certainly not in the diachronic sense of provid-
ing positive and standard forms of aesthetic immersion after subjecting the audience to a stretch of 
intentionally tedious content. Call this second form of resolution “prompted” and think of it as 
requiring the audience to create the conditions of resolution. In an episodically boring work, we often 
seek to escape our weariness by finding a feature of the work in which attention can take immersive 
interest. In the case of enacted forms of resolution, this will usually be an event in the artwork, 
timed by the artist to arrive at just the right moment so that the audience’s affective state is changed, 
hopefully for the better. In prompted forms of resolution, however, the positive features are there, 
and usually have been all along, though they may be intentionally occluded and at any rate are 
unacknowledged. The audience must therefore expand its attentional and interpretative horizons if 
it is to find these positive features. We are thus called on to become proper aesthetic agents, since 
it is through our efforts that positively valenced aesthetic properties emerge and are made available 
to appreciation. In this respect, the artist of boredom often harnesses the call to agency that we 
have already seen is distinctive to the affect itself, understood on the functional model elaborated 
above.  
 Slow cinema typically makes excellent use of prompted forms of resolution. The lack of any 
discernable plot or dramatic structure can motivate one to focus on aesthetic features of a film, for 
instance, photography, camerawork, sound, or staging. The work of art withholds meaning from 
the place where we usually and easily find it (the plot) only to rouse us to discover it personally and 
often effortfully elsewhere. As Karl Schoonover notes, “Art cinema exploits its spectator’s bore-
dom, becoming as much a cinema of expectancies as one of attractions. It turns boredom into a 
kind of special work, one in which empty onscreen time is repurposed, renovated, rehabilitated” 
(Schoonover 2012: 70-71). Consequently, works of this sort intentionally involve a violation of our 




of art offers is not a complete or absolute refusal of engagement. The refusal is both strategic and 
temporary: the boring features of the work of art are such that they invite the spectator to restore 
meaning and value. Precisely because of the search for meaning and value that it occasions, bore-
dom can lead the spectator to engage in sophisticated forms of critical and interpretive scrutiny, 
exploring the formal, aesthetic, and expressive features of work for that thing of value. When that 
thing is found, we establish the conditions for aesthetic immersion, but the search itself is arguably 
of more value, if clearly not in respect to the hedonic value of the experience, then surely in the 
just as serious matter of teaching us how to explore artworks for value and refining our ability to 




We now have two broadly “internal” senses in which episodically boring works can bear aesthetic 
fruit as well as a much richer sense of why boredom might be a desideratum of works with serious 
artistic goals. But the hard problem is the possibility of resolutely boring art, that is, art that is good 
because of the manner in which it bores, and how does any of this demystify its existence? Our claim 
is that resolutely boring art is of a piece with episodically boring art of the prompted sort, though 
with one crucial difference. As we will argue, in the case of resolutely boring art, the meanings and 
objects of value we seek are not internal to the work itself. In this way we can be literalists, up to a 
reasonable degree, about the phenomenon: there are works of art whose properties are exhaust-
ively boring yet which still create conditions for positive varieties of experience and appraisal. If 
boredom is a kind of situational crisis that calls on us to find features of our environment that can 
relieve it (Van Tilburg and Igou 2011, 2012), the move we are suggesting is effectively that of 
broadening the notion of the aesthetically relevant situation. Thus when bored spectators are 
prompted to find meaning, they are granted access to an expanded field of attention and potential 
immersion, and in a manner that in no way entails that the boring work has become something 
else, something now “unboring.”  
 Much of what makes the idea of resolutely boring art appear odd is a natural but impover-
ished picture of the nature of art and the structure of our experience of it. Despite appearances, 
there is nothing inconsistent in saying that we find the object before us both thoroughly boring and 
art, even good art. That is, we can affirm that the semantic, sonic, or visual surface of certain 




boring items, and intentionally so. All this commits us to is the claim that the material aspects of 
an artwork are boring; and while it is of course through their material features that artworks are 
made present to us, they are in no way reducible to them. There are many ways of developing this claim, 
but, for our purposes, we can put it in terms of the difference between two basic stances we can 
take toward a work of art when considering questions of its meaning and significance: an object-
stance and an event-stance, with each designating a perspective we can take on a work and not at all 
competing accounts of the nature of art.  
We use “object-stance” to betoken a narrowly perceptual mode of attending to an artwork 
that focuses attention solely on the displayed qualities of the thing before us. This is intuitive 
enough, and it is the notion of an event-stance that requires explanation. We intend “event” in an 
ordinary rather than metaphysical sense.16 There are two perfectly colloquial senses in which we 
speak of certain artworks as events. We can speak of an artwork as representing the discovery of 
perspective or the harmonic potential of tritone substitutions, where “represents” in this context 
has nothing to do with depiction and everything to do with signaling that the work constitutes a 
significant occurrence in the natural history of an art form. In another clearly related sense, we 
speak of a work as an event when we wish to draw attention to the particular coup it wishes to 
effect in the world around it. To think of an artwork as an event and not just as a kind of object is 
in part to try to understand it in light of what it was made to do, bring about, accomplish, demonstrate, or 
make happen: that film reveals the aesthetic limits of Italian neo-realism; this opera establishes the 
dramatic viability of lyrical sentimentalism; that play wants to start a revolution; this poem gets us 
to see race in a new light; and so on. Certain of these things that a work might try to do or bring about 
can be understood in straightforward intentionalist terms; others are statements of the art-historical 
significance of a work and likely require no reference to an author and her will. Regardless of what 
confers these broader forms of meaning and significance on these works—the answer will surely 
vary, depending on the case—the point that matters for our argument is that one stance is clearly 
broader than the other, and in the right sort of way, and it thus suggests where to find the expanded 
field of attention that our argument needs.  
Programmatically, the event-stance renders intelligible expanded statements of a work’s 
aboutness because it permits us to describe features of a work as being thus and such so that some 
 
16  If talk of artworks as events seems extravagant, recall that there is considerable philosophical literature that equates 
them with performances and, to a lesser extent, actions. See Davies (2004), Kivy (2008), and Culler (2015: 125-131) 
for discussion and defense of the art-as-performance model, applied to artforms traditionally contrasted with the 
performing arts (painting, lyric poetry, the novel, etc.). See Gibson (2018) for a limited defense of the idea that works 




further goal might be accomplished or point be made: to show the “failure of language,” in Beck-
ett’s case, or that in film “nothing happens,” in Warhol’s. These goals and points often are in no 
manner stated by the work or to be found within it: they cannot be read off of features of its express 
formal, representational, or expressive properties (see Gibson 2007: 130-136). Thus, when we grasp 
what has earned an artwork status as an event—the move it has successfully made in a given crea-
tive practice, the importance of its contribution to the world of art or ideas, etc.—we must direct 
attention away from consideration of the aesthetic features of an object to scrutiny of the role a work 
has come to play in an artistic tradition. The character of the event that a certain artwork repre-
sents (or wishes to represent, since failure is always possible) is made present to appreciation when 
we situate a work in a network of relationships that yields information about historical context, 
conditions of reception, features of production, standing artistic and political goals, boldness of a 
work relative to the status quo—whatever is needed to bring to relief how a work earned its precise 
claim to mattering. In some instances, answers to questions of a work’s meaning and significance 
are exhausted by descriptions of the inherent interest of a work’s form and content, in which case 
the event-stance effectively collapses into the object-stance.17 If a work just wishes to be beautiful 
or pleasing, this distinction won’t get us very far. In other cases, and the ones that matter for un-
derstanding the possibility of good boring art, the difference between the two perspectives is essen-
tial to appreciation and criticism.  
The difference between these two perspectives is made especially clear when a work prompts 
an audience to search for this contextual and relational information if they are so much as to be 
able to evaluate its goals and relative success in achieving them. When this occurs, we are granted 
access to a distinct mode of aesthetic appraisal and aesthetic experience. Central to our ability to explain success 
here is that we can use aesthetic predicates in new manner, not to highlight positive features of the 
“manifest face” of the object before us but to explain how well or badly a work pulls off its intended 
coup in the artworld. The move a work wishes to make in the artworld can be executed sublimely, 
clumsily, beautifully, tediously, arrestingly, unoriginally, elegantly, shockingly, and so forth. And each of these 
predicates describes a potential field of aesthetic experience, something in which attention can be 
absorbed and on account of which emotion and thought can be enlivened. In cases of this sort, it 
is not, or not just, a work and its properties that matter to aesthetic experience but something much 
broader, namely, a happening in the artworld: an event, modest or seismic, in that region of artistic 
life that itself is a proper target of an audience’s interest, indeed in which interest can be absorbed 
 
17  See Goldie and Schelleken’s (2007) account of the role of ideas in conceptual art their status as primary objects of 




in a recognizably aesthetic manner.  
If our popular theories of the aesthetic do not accommodate such an idea, they are all the 
worse for it. Phenomena such as these are central to criticism, and they identify one of the most 
basic expectations an informed audience will bring to its viewing of new work of art. We might 
hope to see a beautiful or otherwise dazzling object, but we are just as likely to desire to bear witness 
to an event, perhaps momentous, in the artworld, one that to a nonnegligible degree shakes up, 
propels forward, or represents an innovation in the region of artistic practice that matters to us. 
Critical reviews often dedicate much more time to highlighting a work’s relative success or failure 
in this respect than they do to commenting on the aesthetic features of its surface. This is what 
constitutes news in the artworld, and our theories of the aesthetic must take seriously what this 
implies about the nature and point of our experience of art. In short, and to use the language 
introduced above, it implies that aesthetic enrichment is not always, and exclusively, of a work. In 
certain cases, and the ones that we are highlighting here, it is an enrichment of an audience’s sense 
of the character, preoccupations, and creative geography of artistic culture. 
In cases of success, appreciation of the event that a work represents is appreciation of the 
innovation, creativity, and sheer daring of the move it makes in the artworld. Such appreciation 
by necessity directs attention to, and demands consideration of, the standing habits and conceits of 
the artworld, so that we can grasp, by virtue of a work’s intervention, how certain of the practices 
that define it have been liberated, reinvigorated, or set on a new trajectory. It is true that success is 
often modest or unattained, but even the ambitions that underwrite a certain artworld move can 
be proper objects of artistic and aesthetic interest, since the possibilities they imply, regardless of 
whether they are made actual, can be stunning, genius, revolutionary, mind-blowing, and so on. The 
possibilities are effectively descriptions of the creative possibilities of a given artform, and they can 
make a claim on our interest and establish grounds of positive appraisal even when the artworld 
isn’t quite ready for them. In cases such as these, a fair picture of aesthetic experience is not that 
of a relationship between an isolated subject and a discrete object but an image of each as already 
situated in a specific context of artistic production and reception. To use an impressively apt term 
from the jargon of fandom, this context effectively specifies a “scene” that can be characterized in 
varying degrees of determinacy: expressionism in classical music, post-war Parisian jazz, high mod-
ernist poetic objectivism, or SoCal punk of the early 1980s.18 It is entirely intuitive to think that 
scenes, as indicating more or less tightly organized regions of artworld activity, can be “objects” of 
 
18  See Jesse Prinz’s work on punk aesthetics for a discussion that develops this general idea in a novel direction. For 




artistic and aesthetic involvement, indeed that particular artworks are at times of primary interest 
because it is through them that we are granted experiential access to this more general field of inter-
est: the artworld and the various subcultures of it in which we are often intensely invested.  
An example would help. Assume Empire is resolutely boring in the sense elaborated here. Now 
consider the profile of an audience that is plausibly of the sort to view it in its entirety. First things 
first, our imagined audience, like nearly any audience, will arrive on the scene with standing inter-
ests and concerns in the corner of the artworld to which the film intends to contribute. They will 
have a stake in this and be possessed of a respectable amount of knowledge of its history and in-
vested in seeing its future unfold. The film certainly bores, as the audience will readily aver. But 
that does not exhaust the possibilities, and we can easily provide them with an expanded field of 
attention. For one, the institution of film and the practice of film-making, and how Empire contrib-
utes to them. Or perhaps it is experimental art, the avant-garde, the work and career of Warhol 
himself, among many other possibilities. Whatever it is, if they remain in their seats,19 their interest 
will concern features of the culture and future of an artform they care about deeply, and this suffices 
to explain why they would be inclined to watch unfold, over more than eight stultifying hours, a 
new chapter in its history, and to say of the total experience that it was valuable.  
Note that the audience’s avowal is compatible with their insistence that the film is thoroughly 
boring. In fact, it is by being boring that Empire makes its exact point, and that the point has been 
successfully made is part of what they are avowing. Their response is neither contradictory nor 
does it imply that the film, because of their affirmation of the value of the total experience, is some-
how now transformed into an object that is no longer boring. Unlike the above examples of internal 
varieties of reconciliation, the way in which this audience is here prompted to find meaning and 
value leaves the object just as it was, and in fact demands that it be experienced as resolutely boring 
for the experience to be intelligible as the kind of experience that it is. The manner of reconciliation 
does not change the affective valence of the work but the conditions of the work’s reception, and it 
does so by expanding the notion of the relevant aesthetic situation so that it includes contextual 
information. It is this experience, complex and inclusive of more than just a mere the object, that 
 
19  A reviewer contended, surely rightly, that most viewers likely never stayed in their seats for the entire duration of 
the film. In our argument Empire is intended as a placeholder for an artwork that is resolutely boring, many of which 
do not require quite so much time or effort. Be that as it may, many of the scores of professional critics and scholars 
who have celebrated (and helped secure the status of) these resolutely boring works, including Empire, certainly suffered 
through them and on occasion offered a good-faith account of why they found the experience valuable. This is all our 




the audience presumably affirms and is willing to describe as valuable, even as aesthetically re-
warding.  
It is true that much of what is functioning as the foci of interest and immersion here are 
external to Empire, but it would also be wrongheaded to say that now something other than the film 
is affirmed as aesthetically valuable, say features of the artworld that are wholly beyond the object. 
This is wrong for the obvious reason that it is not some other thing called the artworld that one is 
attending to, because the artworld is here considered as inclusive of the boring film. It is the film 
itself that frames and gives content to whatever sense of the artworld and the significance of an 
event in it that the audience is appreciating. It is an expanded field of attention, not a different one. 
If the audience were called on to articulate their experience of Empire, we would expect constant 
reference to the thorough boringness of the film. All we have added to this is the expectation that 
reference to the features of artworld practices and their history will be made, too, in order to pro-
vide relevant context for their positive appraisal of Warhol’s apparent achievement.   
To pull a series of general points out of this, the possibility of boring art rests on the possibility 
of a complex but not atypical form of aesthetic experience. The kinds of pleasure and immersion 
typical of this experience are unlikely to be of the positively charged and intensely felt pleasure of 
the rapt audience beholding a sublime object. We should not expect that. In the examples we have 
adduced, from Andy Warhol and Samuel Beckett to John Ashbery and David Foster Wallace, the 
works effect their particular magic by way of creating a heightened state of boredom, since this is 
how they make vivid to thought and feeling the point they wish to make about the value of human 
communication, the condition of modernity, the nature of film, or the difference between art and 
everything else. A generous measure of tedium must be served if their points are to be brought fully 
home, since in each case it is the precise affective quality of the experience their works are intended 
to produce that gives substance to the precise point their works wish to make, and thus boredom is 
an ineliminable feature of it, indeed the very thing that makes their points felt and so objects of 
genuine experience and not merely of understanding.  
The kind of pleasure that is compatible with this is the sort we have when we can affirm, 
sincerely and without hedging, that an object must be just as it is for an experience we deem valu-
able to be the experience that it is. This is to say that we desire the experience, and that its character 
is not only accepted but, in effect, willed. This is not at all like physical therapy, where we would 
greatly prefer to have the pleasure of recovery without the pain of achieving it. The experience the 
successful work of boring art makes possible is not just attenuated but unintelligible if shorn of the 




the audience with a thoroughly tedious object that prompts considerations of, and directs attention 
to, a context in which we find a point to the suffering. Our account does not wash away or cancel 
out the pain; it makes it essential for placing further things of value within our reach. Thus, we 
haven’t snuck a new, distinct object of pleasure in through the backdoor so much as shown bore-
dom to be an essential ingredient in a much more complex recipe of aesthetic experience. This is 
a modest rather than bold version of literalism about the possibility of resolutely boring art, but 
modesty is preferable to boldness when the latter leads to nonsense and exaggeration. Our account 
does not treat boredom as something that is clearly not, say a positive emotion that in certain 
contexts we desire for its own sake. But we have shown that a resolutely work, understood against 
an informed theory of the nature of boredom, is one that is part of a total aesthetic experience that 
we can very well desire for its own sake.  
 The functional characterization of boredom that we offered in the previous section highlights 
the distinctive aesthetic affordances that the experience of boredom makes possible. Boredom is 
neither apathy nor, more broadly, a state of equilibrium. It motivates us to escape our felt 
discontent. That is, when we are bored, we are not just bored (dissatisfied, uninterested, or 
unengaged). We also wish to find meaning, engagement, or interest where meaning, engagement, 
or interest evidently are not. It is this motivational aspect of boredom that functions as the prompt 
to find an expanded field of attention. We become concerned, nonplussed, frustrated, or intrigued 
by the fact that a work is resolutely boring. We can’t find any surface or material qualities that 
make the work interesting or engaging but, at the same time, the experience of boredom refuses to 
allow us to rest. We do not declare that the work is simply boring and stop at that. And this presents 
us with a way of thinking about what an aesthetics of boredom might be. It is an aesthetics of 
unease. Like suspense, boredom has a tensed anticipatory dimension that is freighted with aesthetic 
and artistic possibilities. On account of this uneasiness, we search for contextual features that 
illuminate how a work enlists boredom for proper aesthetic and artistic ends. When our efforts bear 
fruit, a new horizon of meaning and ultimately aesthetic engagement is both constituted and 
revealed to us. 
 In a sense, our solution is “formally” identical to the solutions to nearly every puzzle of art 
and negative emotion, since at some level we save the day by identifying an act of meaning-making 
or value-conferral that renders pleasure and appreciation intelligible. At the right level of 
generality, this is also how critics and scholars account for the market of “difficult” modernist art, 
our willingness to engage with the avant-garde, and much else. Since the link between appreciation 




distinctive about our argument is the extent to which is situates the conditions of meaning-making 
in contextual features that surround, but are not internal to, an artwork. This is a much more 
radical move than we find in Gaut- or Carroll-type solutions, or in the many approaches that treat 
aesthetic pleasure and affective interest as a second-order response to a fraught first-order 
experience, since all such moves see properties of a work itself (and features of our experience of 
them) as providing the raw material of their solutions. Regardless, each of the paradoxes of negative 
emotion and art must offer an account of the particular ways an artwork explores and manipulates 
phenomena specific to the affect at the heart of the puzzle, lest we have no answer to the why horror 
(ugliness, disgust, tragedy, etc.)? question. Our argument in this section explains how art can be good 
because boring by showing the crisis of meaning and call to agency distinctive of state boredom to 





Like many studies, part of the value of ours consists in motivating a new problem. If our standing 
theories of the aesthetic suggest incoherence in the very idea of a good work of boring art, many 
notable works of last century show that our theories lag far behind the very artistic practices they 
ought to be able explain. We hope to have made a case for the reality of the phenomenon we have 
explored and the need to get our theories of art on the right side of it. We have also ventured a 
solution to the puzzle we have exposed, one that shows that our theories of the aesthetic need to 
be responsive to a much more complex sense of the nature of aesthetic appreciation and experi-
ence. We have no illusions that more work needs to be done to develop this into a proper theory 
of art and the ways provocative artworks often call on us to find creative grounds for enriching our 
aesthetic experience of them. But boredom can play a privileged role in such an account. No affect 
seems as constitutionally opposed to the concerns of art, and if we can enfranchise boredom in our 
theories of the aesthetic, the long list of other negative emotions that tax philosophers of art will 
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